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Bernabe: Cardozo and Professional Responsibility

AHEAD OF HIS TIME: CARDOZO AND THE CURRENT
DEBATES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Alberto Bernabe*
INTRODUCTION
It is not an exaggeration to affirm that Benjamin Cardozo is one
of the most influential judges in American history.1 He is certainly one
of the most cited.2 In fact, it has been said that students of the law
could organize their whole life, philosophically, morally and
imaginatively, by saturating themselves with the work of a few great
jurists, including Cardozo.3 Cardozo achieved fame, among other
*Professor

of Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author would like to thank Professor
Samuel Levine and the Jewish Law Institute at Touro College Law Center for the invitation to
participate in the Conference “Benjamin Cardozo: Judge, Justice, Scholar” and The John
Marshall Law School for its support in the preparation of this article.
1 Richard Friedman, On Cardozo and Reputation: Legendary Judge, Underrated Justice,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1932 (1991) (describing Cardozo as “one of our greatest judicial
icons” and stating that “Cardozo’s was one of the greatest short tenures on the [Supreme]
Court.”); Bernard Shientag, The Opinions and Writings of Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 597 (1930) (Benjamin N. Cardozo is “the name most commonly identified
with legal scholarship and with the liberal and scientific development of the law in America.”).
On the other hand, see RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO, A STUDY IN REPUTATION vii (1990)
(“Although the legal establishment canonized Cardozo during his lifetime and he is still widely
considered not merely one of the greatest judges of all time but a judicial saint, there is
considerable, perhaps an increasing, undercurrent of dubiety.”).
2 In his book CARDOZO, A STUDY IN REPUTATION, Richard Posner discusses his attempt to
measure Cardozo’s reputation and influence by quantifying information about Cardozo’s
citations. Although he admits that the evidence is not conclusive, he states that “it tends to
confirm the high repute in which . . . Cardozo is held.” POSNER, supra note 1, at 91. Among
other things, Posner’s review of the evidence led him to conclude that Cardozo’s opinions for
the New York Court of Appeals are cited substantially more often and have more staying
power than those of his colleagues. POSNER, supra note 1, at 82-83. Commenting on Posner’s
book, Richard Friedman wrote that “[a] detailed citation study was not necessary to
demonstrate that Cardozo is well known.” Friedman, supra note 1, at 1928.
3 JOHN POWYS, THE MEANING OF CULTURE 67, cited in Bernard Shientag, supra note 1, at
597.

63

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2018], Art. 9

64

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

reasons, because of his professionalism and his aptitude for careful
legal analysis.4 As his biographer Andrew Kaufman states, he “lived
for the law, and the law made him famous.”5 And, of course, that fame
is mostly due to his influential opinions.
Much has been written about his famous opinions related to
torts and contracts,6 so I want to emphasize a different aspect of his
jurisprudence: his opinions on the practice of law; or more specifically,
the opinions in which he had the opportunity to evaluate the conduct
of lawyers within the practice of law and the role of the profession in
regulating that practice. I want to talk about Cardozo’s views on the
practice of law itself, on the concept of professionalism and on the
relation between those views and contemporary debates related to
professional responsibility.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF PROFESSIONALISM

The concept of professionalism is usually found at the center
of debates on whether the legal profession is adequately meeting its
public purpose and following its core values and ideals.7 Yet, although
it is understood that it provides the underlying basis upon which the
legal profession’s regulatory system is built,8 it is interesting that there

4

John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1474 (1999) (Cardozo
was a great jurist because he self-consciously combined astute lawyerly analysis with a
sensitivity to social conditions and social norms); Shientag, supra note 1, at 598 (Cardozo’s
opinions “bear the marks of careful preparation, of patient and laborious research, of a
profound understanding of legal principles interpreted in the light of their past history and their
present ethical, social, and economic setting.”); Andrew Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo as a
Pardigmatic Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 281, 282 (1999) (“Cardozo considered the
difficult legal issues at the intersection of his method of philosophy, emphasizing logical
reasoning, and his method of sociology, emphasizing public policy, on an ad hoc basis that
focused on the reasons for particular rules in the context of the facts of each case.”); See also
Robert Keeton, Andrew Kaufman’s Benjamin Cardozo as a Paradigmatic Tort Lawmaker, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1999).
5 ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 3 (1998).
6 Id. at 416 (Cardozo was best known for his torts and contracts opinions).
7 Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 PROF. LAWYER 4 (2008).
8 As explained by Professor Neil Hamilton, “[t]he concept of “professionalism,” separated
from any type of argument that an earlier golden-age existed when ethics were better . . .
describes the important elements of an ethical professional identity into which the profession
should socialize both law students and practicing lawyers. This approach to professionalism
connects the public purpose, core values, and ideals of the profession with the goal of fostering
an ethical professional identity within each lawyer.” Id. at 3.
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is no consensus on how to define the concept of professionalism.9
Sometimes the term is used as a synonym of civility. 10 Sometimes it
is used as an antonym of engaging in a business.11 Sometimes it is
used to refer to a higher social calling.12 Taking these and other
elements often used to define a profession, however, different scholars
have developed broad views on the meaning of the concept. For
example, it has been argued that professionalism encompasses “the
important elements of an ethical professional identity into which the
profession should socialize both law students and practicing lawyers”13
and that a professional is someone engaged

9
Thomas Morgan, The Fall and Rise of Professionalism, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 451 (1985)
(professionalism is not a self-defining term); Neil Hamilton, supra note 7, at 5 (“Although
professionalism is a highly useful term to describe the important elements of an ethical
professional identity, legal scholarship currently does not provide a clear definition of the
term.”); American Bar Association, In the Spirit of Public Service, A Blueprint for the
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, REPORT OF THE A.B.A. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM
10 (1986) (professionalism is an elastic concept the meaning and application of which are hard
to pin down); Fred Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1303, 1307 (1995) (professionalism is an abused term); Timothy Terrell &
James Wildman, Rethinking Professionalism, 41 EMORY L. J. 403, 406 (1992) (professionalism
is an elusive concept); Burnele V. Powell, Lawyer Professionalism as Ordinary Morality, 35
S. TEXAS L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1994) (the concept of professionalism is little-defined); Deborah
Rhode, Opening Remarks: Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 458, 459 (2001) (central part of
the “professionalism problem” is lack of consensus about what exactly the problem is). See
also Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1993); Richard C.
Baldwin, Rethinking “Professionalism” and Then Living It!, 41 EMORY L. J. 433 (1992); Susan
Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of
Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney
Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998); John C. Buchanan, The Demise of
Legal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and Implementing Change, 28 VAL. U. L.
REV. 563 (1994); Robert L. Nelson, Professionalism from a Social Science Perspective, S.C.
L. REV. 473 (2001).
10 Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar
Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994).
11 Morgan, supra note 9; Thomas Morgan, Inverted Thinking about Law as a Profession or
Business, THE JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 115, 116-18 (2016) (“There are
probably an inexhaustible number of ways to contrast what it means to be in a profession with
what it means to run a business.”).
12 Hamilton, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that because the early debates on professionalism
were sidetracked, professionalism “for many lawyers has meant the bench and bar’s response
to a perceived loss of both civility and a sense of calling in the profession.”). See also, Michael
Ariens, The Rise and Fall of Social Trustee Professionalism, THE JOURNAL OF THE
PROFESSIONAL 49 (2016). Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical
Relationship of Professionalism to Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 137 (2011); Neil Hamilton, Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the
Formation of an Ethical Professional Identity, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L . J. 470 (2008).
13 Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, supra note 7, at 4.
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in roles that require education substantially beyond that
of most citizens, involve personal judgment that most
who deal with them are not in a position to evaluate,
and work that is so important to public health or
personal freedom that their . . . clients need special
assurance of the professional’s integrity and
reliability.14
As it relates to lawyering, this “special assurance” needed for the
protection of the public is provided in the form of regulation and a
comprehensive system of disciplinary enforcement of that regulation.15
In fact, it can be said that professionalism provides the basis for the
profession’s rules of ethics, or, in other words, that the rules are an
expression of the principles of professionalism.16 And, one of the most
important of these principles is the fact that lawyers owe fiduciary
duties to their clients.
As with other subjects, on this topic Cardozo was ahead of his
time.17 His views on professionalism and on the regulation of the
profession already reflected this modern approach.
II.

FIDUCIARY DUTY AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE

Much of the law of professional responsibility is derived from,
or related to, the principle that lawyers are fiduciaries of their clients.18
As such, lawyers owe their clients a duty to act with utmost good faith,
candor and honesty, to protect their clients’ confidential information
and to always favor their clients’ interests over those of others or of
their own.19 Cardozo understood this principle because his approach
14

Morgan, Inverted Thinking, supra note 11, at 116.
Morgan, Inverted Thinking, supra note 11, at 115, 117, citing JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE
LAW: BUSINESS OF PROFESSION (1916), for the proposition that self-regulation is an inherent
element to professional status. See also RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN DZIENKOWSKI,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A STUDENT’S GUIDE 33 (2012-13) (One cannot discuss the
regulation of law without recognizing that it is a “profession”).
16 See Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, supra note 7, at 12-13.
17 Interestingly, according to his biographer, Cardozo was lionized in his day as a
“progressive judge” who used his role as a judge to modernize legal doctrines. Andrew
Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo as a Paradigmatic Tort Lawmaker, supra note 4, at 282.
18 ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 42.
19 ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 42. As explained by Professor Neil
Hamilton, “[a] lawyer owes a client the fiduciary duties of safeguarding confidences and
property, avoiding impermissible conflicts of interest, dealing honestly with the client,
adequately informing the client, following the instructions of the client, and not employing
15
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in deciding cases was influenced greatly by his experience as a
lawyer,20 and it is quite possible that Cardozo’s own practicing
lawyer’s perspective influenced, if not determined, the outcome of at
least some cases.21
In Moller v Pickard,22 for example, Cardozo wrote an opinion
that exemplifies his view on this subject. In that case, a group of
minority shareholders in a business entity sued the entity’s lawyer
because the lawyer had bought shares in the entity when the entity was
failing.23 The plaintiffs argued the attorney had taken advantage of the
situation and betrayed their trust and his duty to the client.24 In a short
opinion finding in favor of the attorney-defendant, Cardozo explained
that attorneys have a duty to make sure business transactions with
clients are “fair and open,”25 and that attorneys have a duty to make
full disclosure to the clients, and to retain nothing without their
knowledge and approval.26 Applying these principles to the facts of
the case, Cardozo found that the attorney did not violate his fiduciary
duty, concluding the case was “not one of selfish or malign endeavor
on the part of an attorney to gain title for himself to the injury of a
client.”27 Rather it was an example of a case in which the attorney
conducted himself according to his duty and acted in response to the
client’s request “with the fullest understanding and approval of every
detail of the transaction.”28
Cardozo’s opinion in Moller is short and direct, providing
essentially just the conclusion of the analysis rather than an
explanation of the analysis that resulted in that conclusion. At the time,
this was Cardozo’s usual practice. He limited statements of principle
adversely to the client powers arising from the attorney-client relationship. This body of law
calls on the lawyer to restrain self-interest similar to what the law of fiduciary duty requires of
other agents in fiduciary relationships.” Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, supra
note 7, at 12.
20 Andrew Kaufman, Response to Robert E. Keeton and Gary T. Schwartz, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 319 (1999).
21 Id.; see also KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 416 (fiduciary duty was a key element
in Cardozo’s decisions in both corporate law and the law governing lawyers); Goldberg, supra
note 4, at 1474 (Cardozo conceived of himself as a participant in the practice of law; he
maintained the “internal point of view” of the legal practitioner).
22 232 N.Y. 271 (N.Y. App. 1922).
23
Id. at 273.
24 Id. at 274.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Moller, 232 N.Y. at 275.
28 Id. at 275.
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to the particular factual setting of the case at hand.29 However, a few
years later he departed from this practice when he authored his most
famous opinion on the subject of fiduciary duties: his decision in
Meinhard v. Salmon.30
Meinhard involved an alleged usurpation of a business
opportunity by a member of a joint venture.31 In this case, the plaintiff
and the defendant had agreed to a joint venture to lease, renovate and
operate a hotel. Toward the end of the duration of the lease, the
defendant negotiated a new deal with the owner of the property, which
resulted in a new lease, without informing the plaintiff.32 The plaintiff
then sued, claiming the defendant had deprived him of participating in
the new venture and demanded his share of the interest in the new
agreement.33 After the plaintiff prevailed in the lower courts, Cardozo
wrote the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment
based on his understanding of the principles of fiduciary duties:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workday
world . . . are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but . . .
an honor the most sensitive, is the standard of
behavior. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden
by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by a
judgment of this court.34
Cardozo did not base his conclusion on precedent cases but on
his interpretation of a general principle that suggested a duty of
undivided loyalty as the basis of a fiduciary relationship. And in
deciding the case this way, Cardozo was ahead of his time. Even
though the defendant had not violated an explicit rule at the time,
Cardozo’s opinion essentially stood for the proposition that the rules
29

KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 239.
249 N.Y. 458 (N.Y. App. 1928).
31 Id. at 458-59.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 464. Interestingly, just as they had done in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248
N.Y. 339 (N.Y. 1928), Cardozo wrote the majority opinion and Judge Andrews wrote a
dissenting opinion. Andrews agreed on the principles related to fiduciary duties but disagreed
on Cardozo’s interpretation of the facts of the case. For Andrews, the new lease was not an
extension of the original joint venture, but a new and different business transaction because it
involved more properties and many new terms and conditions. Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 473.
30
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ought to be different going forward. For this reason, it has been said
that the opinion showed “prophetic insight” and that “no judge has ever
come up with a better formula for stating the fiduciary’s duty.35
This principle of a “high fiduciary duty,” which was the
culmination of Cardozo’s efforts to implant a sense of honorable
conduct,36 is what formed the basis of Cardozo’s opinions on the
practice of law.37 In In the Matter of Rouss,38 for example, Cardozo
emphasized that “membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions”39 including maintaining fitness of character that advances
the dignity of the profession. Likewise, in Andrewes v. Hass,40 a case
in which a lawyer sued his own client, Cardozo criticized the lawyer
for wanting to favor his own interest in a profit over the client’s right
to terminate the representation.41 For Cardozo, the notion that a
lawyer could behave in such a way would betray “the function of the
legal profession and of its duty to society.”42
III.

REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION

Cardozo’s principle of a “high fiduciary duty” also formed the
basis of the American Bar Association’s efforts to draft and
promulgate a code of legal ethics43 and, therefore, of Cardozo’s
understanding of the notion of, and the need for, regulation of the
profession. He understood that the fiduciary duty owed by lawyers had
to be regulated, that violations of the regulation had to be strictly
35 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 241 (citing Russell Niles, Contemporary View of
Liability for Breach of Trust, 29 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, 574, 575-76, and POSNER, supra note 1, at 104-05.
36 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 241, 242. (Cardozo emphasized personal obligation
which meant honorable conduct in fiduciary roles).
37 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 425 (Cardozo “was uncompromising in his pursuit
of responsible behavior and a clean image for the profession.”).
38 221 N.Y. 81 (1917).
39 Id. at 84.
40 214 N.Y. 255 (1915).
41 Id. at 258 (“The employment of a lawyer to serve for a contingent fee does not make it
the client’s duty to continue the lawsuit and thus increase the lawyer’s profit.”).
42 Id. at 258-59.
43 James M. Altman, Considering the ABA’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
2395 (2003) (Underlying the ABA’s efforts was the idea that it is possible to articulate and
maintain a level of lawyer conduct that is something higher, something better, than the
minimal normative standards imposed by the criminal law or, what Benjamin Cardozo called
twenty years later, the “morals of the market place”) (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
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enforced and that violations of the regulation should have
consequences.
In addition, if Cardozo’s approach to proper ethical conduct
was based on regulation without specific rules of professional conduct,
there still would have to be a mechanism, or authority, for the
implementation of the regulation. It would be odd to recognize a need
for implementation and imposition of consequences if there was no
agency with the authority to do so. Yet, for Cardozo this was a
straightforward issue. Clearly, it was the courts which had direct
authority over the regulation of the profession.
An early example of Cardozo’s approach to the notion of
regulation of the profession can be found in In the Matter of Rouss.44
In that case, writing for a unanimous court, Cardozo found that the
state had the authority to disbar a lawyer for having confessed to
misconduct even though the testimony was offered under statutory
immunity protection.45 He reasoned that the immunity provided by a
state statute did not apply to the authority of the courts to regulate the
profession:
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A fair private and professional character is
one of them. Compliance with that condition is
essential at the moment of admission; but it is equally
essential afterwards. . . . Whenever the condition is
broken, the privilege is lost. To refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offenses. The examination into character, like the
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness. To
strike the unworthy lawyer from the roll is not to add to
the pains and penalties of crime. The examination into
character is renewed; and the test of fitness is no longer
satisfied.46
A decade later, in People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,47 Cardozo
expanded on his view on the regulation of the practice of the profession
finding that courts had the authority to compel testimony, and to
impose penalties for contempt on those who refused to testify, as part
44
45
46
47

221 N.Y. 81 (1917).
Id.
Id. at 84-85.
248 N.Y. 465 (1928).
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of an investigation into generalized misconduct within the
profession.48 Based on his interpretation of English law and the state
Constitutions, and citing Rouss for the proposition that “[m]embership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,” Cardozo concluded
that attorneys had a professional duty to cooperate with the courts in
order to protect the honor of the profession.49 More importantly, he
specifically held that there was “little room for doubt” that attorneys
might be regulated by rules and orders of the courts, including the
authority to compel testimony as part of an investigation into
misconduct.50 Thus, in Rouss, Cardozo subordinated the individual
rights of an attorney to the standards of the profession, and in Culkin
he placed the authority to administer those standards in the courts.
IV.

THE CURRENT DEBATES ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY

Grounded on this framework, during his tenure in the New
York Court of Appeals, Cardozo participated in a number of cases that
addressed issues regarding the practice of law that we are still debating
today, including the difficulty of defining what constitutes “the
practice of law,” and, for that reason, the limits of statutes banning the
unauthorized practice of law. As explained by Cardozo’s biographer
Andrew Kaufman, “Cardozo attempted to translate his views about the
professional obligations of attorneys to their clients into a broad right
of lawyers and the public to protection from competition by persons
and organizations who were not lawyers and hence were not similarly
regulated.”51 That concern is similar to the current debate over whether
entities like Quicken Loans or LegalZoom are engaged in the practice
of law,52 and over whether it would be a good idea to allow nonlawyers to provide some legal services.53
48

Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 470-71.
50 Id. at 477.
51 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 427.
52 For a discussion of some of the issues related to this topic see, among others, Alberto
Bernabe, Justice Gap vs. Core Values: The Common Themes in the Innovation Debate, 41
THE JOURNAL OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (2016); Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of
Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 49, 58 (2015); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified
Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLORIDA L. REV. 977 (2003); Raymond H. Brescia,
Uber for Lawyers: The Transformative Potential of a Sharing Economy Approach to the
Delivery of Legal Services, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 745 (2016).
53 See supra note 52.
49
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Cardozo would probably not have been a fan of Quicken Loans
or LegalZoom. Actually, to say that is unfair. Cardozo probably would
not have liked Quicken Loans and LegalZoom in the 1920s or 1930s,
but a lot has changed since then, and it is impossible to know whether
Cardozo’s views would have changed over time. For that reason,
ironically, the most interesting aspect of Cardozo’s opinions is not how
they show that things have changed but how they seem to have
remained the same. The fact is the legal profession is still debating
some of the same issues today.
Compare, for example, People v Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,54
decided in 1919 and Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,55 decided by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina in July 2017. In People v Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., Cardozo wrote a short dissenting opinion in a
case involving facts that raised similar questions as those raised by the
debate regarding Quicken Loans and LegalZoom. The case involved a
corporation in the business of guaranteeing bonds, mortgages and titles
to real estate charged with a violation of a statute that banned
corporations from holding themselves out to the public as being
entitled to practice law, or to render legal services.56 The Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction, but Cardozo dissented.57
The question presented by the case, and still debated today,
relates to the definition of the practice of law.58 At what point does the
provision of legal forms, or even legal advice, become the practice of
law? In his concurring opinion, Judge Pound addressed the question
as follows:
Doubtless many individuals, unlearned in the law,
occasionally draw deeds, wills, mortgages and other
instruments without rendering legal services in the
common acceptance of the term who would be startled
to learn that they had criminally engaged in the practice
of law. The test of the legislative intent is to be found,
however, in the present day evil which the legislation
aims to correct. The evil addressed seems to be, both in
the case of the individual and the corporation, the
practice of rendering, with some continuity, services of
54
55
56
57
58

227 N.Y. 366 (1919).
Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 803 S.E.2d 707 (S.C. 2017).
Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. at 369.
Id. at 381.
See generally People v Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366 (1919).
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the character now generally performed by lawyers as a
part of their ordinary routine. . . . The legislation is in
aid of the lawyers, and for the protection of the public,
and is antagonistic to the policy which would permit
any one to act habitually as a scrivener or
conveyancer. . . . This does not imply that a real estate
broker may not prepare leases, mortgages and deeds, or
that an installment house may not prepare conditional
bills of sale, in connection with the business and as a
part thereof. The preparation of the legal papers may be
ancillary to the daily business of the actor or it may be
the business itself. The emphasis may be upon the
services of the broker or the business of the trader or it
may be upon the practice of law.59
In other words, for Judge Pound the key is whether providing
legal services is the main business of the entity in question, or whether
it is simply a part of, or ancillary to, the main business. Cardozo agreed
with this approach to the issue, but reached a different conclusion when
applied to the facts of the case. Pound concluded that the corporation
did not make it a business to prepare legal forms “for all who apply,
independently of its chartered powers.”60 In other words, he did not
think the corporation was in the business of providing and filling out
legal documents; it was in a business that incidentally required it to
help its customers fill out the documents. As he concluded, the
corporation “does not hold itself out as preparing legal instruments
generally but only in connection with its legitimate business.”61
Cardozo disagreed. He opined that the conviction should have been
affirmed because filling out legal forms should be considered to be
practicing law.62
It is fascinating that this debate is essentially the same we are
still having as part of the discussion of the modern concept of
“innovation” and the new contours of the legal marketplace.63 Take,
for example, the recent decision in Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,
decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in July 2017, the facts

59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id. at 381; see also KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 427.
See supra note 52.
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of which are eerily similar to those of People v Title Guarantee & Trust
Co. and which perfectly illustrates the point.
In Boone, a group of homeowners filed a request for a
declaratory judgment arguing that Quicken Loans, a nationwide online
mortgage lender, was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in
South Carolina when refinancing the homeowners’ mortgage loans.64
In deciding that Quicken Loans was not engaged in the practice of law,
the court reiterated its position that “it is neither practicable nor wise
to attempt a comprehensive definition [of the practice of law] by way
of a set of rules.”65 The court explained it is preferable “to decide
what is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law in the context
of an actual case or controversy rather than through an abstract set of
guidelines,”66 keeping in mind that the policy of prohibiting laymen
from practicing law exists for the purpose of protecting the public by
preventing the intrusion of incompetent and unlearned persons in the
practice of law, rather than for the purpose of creating a monopoly in
the legal profession, a proposition for which it cited a precedent from
1939.67
Although it is difficult to point to a specific moment when the
debate regarding “innovation” began, it is safe to say that LegalZoom’s
“do it yourself” approach to legal services had something to do with it.
Although LegalZoom provides access to services that might otherwise
be unavailable to many people, its new approach to the provision of
legal services was not necessarily well received. Just like the
corporation involved in People v Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
LegalZoom faced opposition from the bar and the courts in many
states.68 At the end of 2009, LegalZoom was sued in Missouri for
engaging in unauthorized practice of law.69 Also, in November 2010,
64

Boone, 803 S.E.2d at 455.
Id. at 461 (quoting In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124-25
(S.C. 1992)). The court also pointed out that other jurisdictions have adopted the same
approach. Id. at 460 n.6 (citing In re Shoe Mfrs. Protective Ass’n, 3 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Mass.
1936)) (reaffirmed by Real Estate Bar Ass’n for Massachusetts, Inc. v. Nat’l Real Estate Info.
Servs., 946 N.E.2d 665, 674 (Mass. 2011)).
66 Id. at 461 (quoting In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124–25
(1992).
67 Boone, at 459-60, (citing State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 5 S.E.2d 181, 186 (S.C. 1939)).
68 See Gene Quinn, LegalZoom Continues Unauthorized Practice of Law, IPWATCHDOG,
February 3, 2009 available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/02/03/legalzoom-continuesunauthorized-practice-of-law/id=1899/.
69 Nathan Koppel, Class Action Claims Online Legal Forms Pose Threat To Consumers,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL BLOG, (July 27, 2011), available at https://blogs.wsj.com/law
65
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the Pennsylvania Bar issued an opinion concluding that many online
legal document preparation services, including many of the services
provided by LegalZoom, constituted the unauthorized practice of
law.70 Then, perhaps tired of being on the defensive, in 2011,
LegalZoom sued the North Carolina Bar challenging its application of
the rules regarding unauthorized practice.71
Over time, LegalZoom’s battles helped the discussion evolve
from a debate on finding ways to practice law more efficiently to a
debate on finding different ways in which to provide legal services,
including debates as to who should be allowed to practice law to begin
with. In other words, the discussion of innovation in the practice of law
has become a discussion about the regulation of the practice of law.72
The title of a Canadian document on the subject provides a great
illustration of this point. The document is titled “Innovative
Regulation.” In it, the Bar Associations of three Canadian provinces
discuss possible new regulatory approaches in light of changes in the
/2011/07/27/class-action-claims-online-legal-forms-pose-threat-toconsumers/?mod=WSJBlog;
Gene Quinn, LegalZoom Sued in Class Action for Unauthorized Law Practice, IPWATCHDOG,
(Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/02/09/legalzoom-sued-inclass-action-for-unauthorized-law-practice/id=8816/. That claim eventually settled. Alberto
Bernabe, Legal Zoom settles claim of unathorized practice of law, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY BLOG, August 23, 2011, available at http://bernabepr.blogspot.com/2011/
08/legal-zoom-settles-claim-of-unathorized.html.
70 Penn. Bar Assoc., Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee Formal Op. 2010-01 (Mar.
10, 2010), available at http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/unautpra/Opinions/201001LglDocument Preparation.pdf
71 Nathan Koppel, LegalZoom Sues North Carolina Bar, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL LAW
BLOG, (Oct. 7, 2011), available at https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/07/legalzoom-suesnorth-carolina-bar/?mod=WSJBlog. Eventually, the parties agreed to suspend the litigation to
give the state legislature a chance to amend the definition of the practice of law. The
amendment was approved in 2015 to redefine the term “practice of law” by exempting
services that provide blank legal documents. See Alberto Bernabe, Legal Zoom
Settles Case vs North Carolina Bar, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BLOG, (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://bernabepr.blogspot.com/2015/10/legal-zoom-settles-case-vs-north.html.
72 The amendment to the North Carolina rules which redefined the practice of law in order
to allow LegalZoom to conduct business in the state also imposed new regulation on the
company. For example, anyone seeking to provide the types of services at issue must register
with the State Bar every year, and each type of document must be reviewed and approved by
a licensed North Carolina attorney before it is available online. The services also must include
a disclaimer that the online documents are not a substitute for seeking legal advice, and any
customer satisfaction disputes must be referred to the State Bar. See Alberto Bernabe, Legal
Zoom Settles Case vs North Carolina Bar, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BLOG, (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://bernabepr.blogspot.com/2015/10/legal-zoom-settles-case-vs-north.html. For a good
discussion of some of the issues involved on whether LegalZoom should be regulated
by the legal profession see the discussion of some members of the Legal Ethics
Forum blog at Legal Zoom Redux, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM, (May 5, 2014), available at
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2014/05/legal-zoom-redux.html.
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practice of the profession, including the controversial notion of
alternative business structures which allow attorneys to partner with
non-attorneys to provide legal services.73 Likewise, Washington State,
for example, has approved regulation to administer a program that
allows non-lawyer professionals to be certified to provide certain
services previously provided by lawyers in divorce cases. 74 Other
states have, or are working toward establishing, similar programs.75
Yet, as stated above, these new developments are controversial
and the debate continues, mostly dominated by two distinct themes:
the “Justice Gap” and the “Core Values” themes.76 The Justice Gap
theme focuses on the need to develop ways to improve the way the
profession serves the legal needs of people who need them.77 The Core
Values theme focuses on the need to oppose some types of innovation
because of the need to protect principles upon which the practice of the
profession is based.78 How these themes are addressed by regulatory
agencies in the near future will determine the fate of the discussion on
innovation in the practice of law in the United States.
If all of this sounds familiar to fans of Cardozo’s opinions it is
because, again, the underlying themes within that debate79 can be
73 See Innovative Regulation, A Collaboration of the Prairie Law Societies, (Nov. 2015),
available at http://www.lawsociety.sk.ca/media/127107/ INNOVATINGREGULATION.pdf.
See also Barbra Bailey, Innovating Regulation, LEGAL SOURCERY, December 21, 2015,
https://lsslib.wordpress.com/2015/12/21/innovating-regulation.
74 Thea Jennings, An Access to Justice First: Washington State’s Limited Licensing
Program for Nonlawyers, @Law, Fall 2014 at 28, 29. Elizabeth Chambliss, Law School
Training for Licensed “Legal Technicians”? Implications for the Consumer Market, 65 S.C.
L. REV. 579, 580 (2014); Robert Ambrogi, UnAuthorized Practice, ABA JOURNAL, Jan. 2015,
at 72, 74.
75 Commissions in California and Oregon have proposed programs similar to the one in
Washington. See Chambliss, supra note 74, at 590. The report of the California commission
is available at http://board.calbar.ca.gov/ docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem1000013003.
pdf. The report of the Oregon commission is available at http://bog11.homestead.com/
LegalTechTF/Jan2015/Report_22Jan2015.pdf. Vermont and New York have created
commissions to study the issue. Chambliss, supra note 74, at 592; Ambrogi, supra note 74,
at 78. For a good discussion of the benefits of a program of non-lawyer legal services see
Perlman, supra note 52, in which he argues that Washington State’s LLLT program is creating
a new, and likely lower cost, option for consumers by allowing appropriately trained and
regulated professionals to engage in some kinds of law practice without a law degree. Perlman
concludes that “[i]n the end, the LLLT program serves the public interest and advances the
regulatory objectives that should form the core of the law of legal services.” Perlman, supra
note 52, at 112.
76 See Bernabe, supra note 52.
77 See supra note 52.
78 Bernabe, supra note 52.
79 For a discussion of these themes, see Bernabe, supra note 52.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/9

14

Bernabe: Cardozo and Professional Responsibility

2018

CARDOZO AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

77

found in them. For Cardozo, the main theme relates to the need to
preserve, or protect, the core values of the profession. For those who
promote innovation and access to legal services, the main theme relates
to the need to close the “justice gap” in our society.80 The continuing
debate over the definition of the practice of law, and of who can
provide legal services, is just one example of the consequences of
efforts to modify the legal marketplace in order to confront the justice
gap.
Just like some current authors do, Cardozo would probably
argue that the trend in innovation based on technology enabled
delivery of legal services in an effort to make the practice of law less
expensive and more efficient reduces what used to be a profession
focusing on providing services to clients to the sale of a commodity to
consumers.81 This “commoditization” of the profession, which some
The phrase “justice gap” is often used in reference to the fact that even though there are
enough lawyers available, the legal needs of most Americans are not being met. This reality
has created a demand for programs that provide access to solutions to legal issues, which in
turn has resulted in calls for more “innovation” in the way in which legal services are provided.
Selina Thomas, Rethinking Unauthorized Practice of Law in Light of the Access to
Justice Crisis, 23 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1, 3 (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/professional_lawyer/2015/volume-23-number-3/rethinking_unauthorized_
practice_law_light_the_access_justice_crisis.html (referring to the “daunting justice gap” and
pointing out that 80 to 85 percent of the US population who is need of civil legal services is
underserved); Ambrogi, supra note 74 at 72, 74 (Multiple state and federal studies show that
80 to 90 percent of low and moderate income Americans with legal problems are unable to
obtain or afford legal representation.). Thea Jennings, supra note 74, at 28, 29 (discussing a
study by the Supreme Court of Washington which found that 88% of people of lower means
attempted to resolve their legal issues without legal representation); Milan Markovic, Juking
Access to Justice to Deregulate the Legal Market, 29 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 63, 65 (2016);
American Bar Association Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Issues Paper
Concerning New Categories of Legal Service Providers, October 16, 2015, at 2 (Numerous
studies over many decades reveal that cost is a significant impediment to accessing legal
services for most low and moderate income Americans, especially when they face significant
civil legal problems.). See Ronald C. Minkoff, Access to Justice and a New Definition of
Professionalism, N.Y. LEGAL ETHICS REPORTER, (Sep. 1, 2015) available at http://
www.newyorklegalethics.com/access-to-justice-and-a-new-definition-of-professionalism;
ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Report on the Future of Legal Services in
the United States 5, 10-18 (2016), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/images/abanews/2016FLSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf (finding that despite sustained efforts
to expand the public’s access to legal services, significant unmet needs persist).
81 See Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to Justice Requires Access to Attorneys: Restrictions on
the Practice of Law Serve a Societal Purpose, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761 (2014) (unauthorized
practice of law restrictions are necessary to preserve the “core values” of the legal
profession—i.e., that clients should receive ethically competent legal services from their
attorneys, including the requirement that attorneys are independent and loyal, maintain client
confidences, and eschew conflicts of interest. These core values are what consumers of legal
services have come to expect, whether they retain an attorney or purchase legal services from
80

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2018], Art. 9

78

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

trace to the business models of companies like LegalZoom,82 can be
seen as compromising the profession’s core value of owing a fiduciary
duty to clients and as a threat to the duties owed to clients. According
to this view, commoditization is the result of an effort to cut costs, and
cutting costs can lead to cutting corners at the expense of fiduciary
duties to clients.83
These themes are the same regardless of the prevailing debates
within the profession, including whether American jurisdictions
should allow lawyers to partner with non-lawyers or to share fees with
non-lawyers, or whether non-lawyers should be allowed to provide
limited legal services, or whether lawyers should be allowed to
practice law anywhere in the country regardless of where they passed
the bar exam.84
Facing these issues, Cardozo might have reached different
conclusions in his day than we might be heading for today, but he
clearly would have approached the questions from what we can
consider a current or contemporary view. He understood then what we
are arguing now. In the end, the question that needs to be addressed is
the same question that needs to be addressed when considering any
changes to the regulation of the profession: Will the change benefit
clients and prospective clients in need of access to legal services? Yet,
for now at least, the debates continue.
V.

LOOKING AHEAD TO THE FUTURE

In 2014, the American Bar Association created a Commission
on the Future of Legal Services and charged it with the task of
recommending innovations that would improve the delivery of, and the
public’s access to, legal services in the United States.85 Unfortunately,
the Commission’s work was quickly affected by the prevalent debate
non-attorney providers. These core values are also what have continually maintained our
civil society).
82 See, for example, Raymond Brescia, What We Know and Need to Know About Disruptive
Innovation, 67 S.C. L. REV. 203, 212 (2016).
83 Id.
84 For a good discussion of the contemporary debates on many of these issues, see supra
note 52.
85 The Commission’s final report is available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/images/abanews/2016FLSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf. Alberto Bernabe, ABA Commission on
Future of Legal Services issues its final report; I am not particularly impressed, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY BLOG, (Aug. 11, 2016), available at http://bernabepr.blogspot.com/2016/08/
aba-commission-on-future-of-legal.html.
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on the justice gap and core values. Eventually, and perhaps not
surprisingly, while the ABA encouraged jurisdictions to explore
innovative changes, its initiatives seem to be limited by what Cardozo
would argue is the need to protect the profession’s core values. For that
reason, ironically, the end result is that in an effort to open the doors,
or “liberalize,” the delivery of legal services, the likely result will be
more regulation.86
The fact the debates have not been settled yet is not necessarily
a bad thing, though. In fact, there is a movement afoot that encourages
jurisdictions to adopt specific “regulatory objectives” based on the
premise that “without knowing the underlying objectives of lawyer
regulation, one cannot meaningfully measure whether the regulation
succeeds, or is overbroad, too lenient, or too restrictive.”87 And,
Cardozo would be happy with the objectives that have been
recommended which include: protection of clients, protection of the
public interest, promoting public understanding of the legal system and
respect for the rule of law, supporting the rule of law and ensuring
lawyer independence sufficient to allow for a robust rule-of-law
culture, increasing access to justice, promoting lawyers’ compliance
with professional principles, and ensuring that lawyer regulation is
consistent with principles of “good regulation.”88 Not only do these
reflect the values of the profession that Cardozo emphasized in his
opinions, they are also based on the notion that the regulation of the
profession should be administered by the profession itself.
This, however, opens the door to another current concern
within the profession: if the legal profession’s regulators do not adopt
regulatory objectives, someone else may do so for them (and the results
may be less satisfactory).89 And this brings the discussion full circle
back to People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, in which Cardozo explained
the importance of placing the authority to regulate the legal profession
on the profession itself. As he eloquently put it, the profession’s power
to regulate itself “will make for the health and honor of the profession
and for the protection of the public. If the house is to be cleaned, it is
86

For a very good discussion on what that new approach to regulation might, and perhaps
should, look like see Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional
Regulation, 55 FLORIDA L. REV. 977 (2003).
87 Laurel Terry, Why Your Jurisdiction Should Consider Jumping on the Regulatory
Objectives Bandwagon, 22 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1 (2013).
88 Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the
Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2734-42 (2012).
89 Terry, Why Your Jurisdiction, supra note 87, at 8.
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for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to do the
noisome work.”90 In other words, as explained in Kaufman’s
biography of Cardozo:
Cardozo cared greatly about the honor of the profession
and the role of judges as traditional guardians of that
honor. If the judiciary was to exert control over the
profession, it needed to punish violation of its rules;
otherwise ‘strangers,’ that is, the legislature or an
administrative board, would end up doing the task.91
Interestingly, given that the more things change, the more they
stay the same, eighty-nine years later, the same concern is receiving a
lot of attention. In June, 2017, one of the main speakers at the ABA
National Conference on Professional Responsibility raised that exact
same concern when discussing the alarming picture of how much state
rules vary on what constitutes practicing law in a jurisdiction in
violation of rules regarding unauthorized practice.92 Accepting the
2017 Michael Franck Professional Responsibility Award, Robert
Creamer warned that the legal profession “needs to come up with
uniform ethics rules or else Congress may act on its own to regulate
lawyers.”93 He argued that if the changes are done to us rather than by
us, the result will not likely be something with which we will be
happy.94
It is striking how this debate sounds so familiar when reviewing
Cardozo’s approach to the concept of professionalism. As explained
by Professor Neil Hamilton, one of the defining characteristics of a
profession is that society recognizes the profession’s autonomy to
regulate itself, “expecting the profession’s members to control entry
into and continued membership in the profession, to set standards for
how individual professionals perform their work so that it serves the
public good in the area of the profession’s responsibility, and to foster
90

People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 481 (1928).
KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 429.
92 Joan Rogers, Lawyers Urged to Fix ‘Crazy Quilt’ of State Ethics Rules, 33 ABA/BNA
LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 336 (2017) (discussing speech by Robert Creamer, the 2017
Michael Franck Professional Responsibility Award winner); Robert A. Creamer, Ethics Rules
Uniformity: “The Vision Thing,” 24 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER NO. 3.
93 Id. In fact, a proposal for Congress to adopt a statute that mandates mutual recognition
of rights of practice by lawyers across state borders has already been suggested. See James
Jones, Anthony Davis, Simon Chester and Caroline Hart, Reforming Lawyer Mobility –
Protecting Turf or Serving Clients?, 30 GEO. J. OF L. ETHICS 125, 189 (2017).
94 Id.
91
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the core values and ideals of the profession,”95 all of which is
consistent with Cardozo’s expressed views in People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin.96
VI.

CONCLUSION

Benjamin Cardozo’s opinions on the legal profession reflect
the modern debate on innovation and the future of the legal profession
and the two modern themes upon which that debate is based. He
understood the notion of the profession as a calling that owed duties to
society in general, but he also emphasized the need to preserve the
“honor” of the profession through a strict understanding of the
fiduciary duty owed to clients.
Much of the debate regarding innovation revolves around the
question of whether the current professional regulatory framework
should be redesigned in order to allow new ways to provide legal
services including the delivery of legal services across state borders
and in association with, or even by, non-lawyers. Yet, although the
seeds of the debate can already be detected in some of Cardozo’s
opinions, the discussion does not seem to be ready for resolution.
While the ABA’s Commission on the Future of the Legal Profession
has taken steps to open the door to innovative approaches to the
delivery of legal services, even considering allowing alternative
business structures97 and non-lawyer service providers,98 the ABA
itself continues to avoid embracing some of those approaches.99
While the ABA is encouraging jurisdictions to specifically
address the innovative changes that seem to be disrupting the legal

95 Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, supra note 7, at 4-5; see also ROTUNDA AND
DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 34.
96 248 N.Y. 465, 481 (1928).
97 ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Issues Paper Concerning Alternative
Business Structures, 1 (April 8, 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
images/office_president/alternative_business_issu es_paper.pdf (“The Commission believes
that any consideration of possible regulatory reforms should include an examination of
Alternative Business Structures (ABS).”).
98 Id.
99 Bernabe, supra note 52. The institutional reaction of the ABA is not new. Morgan,
Inverted Thinking, supra note 11, at 121, (even though a 1986 ABA Commission on
Professionalism report concluded that resistance to allowing non-lawyers to provide some
form of legal services “for selfish reasons only brings discredit on the profession, at the ABA
House of Delegates, core values of the legal profession have dominated professionalism
rhetoric.”).
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marketplace, its initiatives seem to be limited by what many argue is
the need to protect the profession’s core values.100 For that reason, as
stated above, ironically, the end result is that in an effort to open the
doors, or “liberalize,” the delivery of legal services, regardless of how
the ABA or individual states decide to address the surge of innovation,
the likely result will be more regulation.101 Thus, how to balance, and
regulate, professional values against the need to meet the legal needs
of the public will continue to be the key to the debate about innovation
in the practice of law.
In the end, sadly, although Cardozo at times may have been
ahead of his time, the passage of time does not seem to have resulted
in a lot of change. In praising Cardozo, Professor Robert Keeton once
wrote that “[w]e continue to celebrate a giant of another generation
even after times and needs of the day have changed.”102 Yet, ironically
it now seems that, at least in matters related to the regulation of the
legal profession, we should continue to celebrate his work because
some of the issues of the times and needs of the day have not changed.

100

Id. It has been argued that this type of limitation is a systemic problem within the
American Bar Association. See James Moliterno, Ethics 20/20 Sucessfully Achieved its
Mission: It “Protected, Preserved, and Mantained,” 47 AKRON L. REV. 149, 159 (2014) (the
lesson is clear: ABA commissions that remain modest with proposals will pass through the
House of Delegates’ gauntlet; ABA commissions that propose actual reform will fail.).
101 See Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, supra note 52.
102 Keeton, supra note 4, at 3.
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